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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Business in America is a very prevalent phenomenon due 
to our capitalistic society. Whether it be big business or 
entrepreneurship, business is there. Due to many factors, 
success in business is hard to attain; therefore, failure is 
very common. The need to study this subject stems from the 
desire to succeed. The unfamiliarity with the factors or 
causes of failure is the most significant problem with 
failure. No one really cares about failure in itself, but 
they do care about what caused it--the steps that led to the 
downfall (Barrickman p. 4). If the businessman understands 
what caused problems in the firm, he would be better 
equipped to handle them. To use an analogy, the reason the 
disease Cancer is so detrimental to our society is because 
no one knows what causes it; therefore, no one can find a 
cure. The businessman needs to know what causes failure so 
that he will be able to cure it before the firm "dies." 
Before continuing any further, it is necessary to 
define a few terms that will be used throughout this paper 
and that could get very confusing. There seems to be a need 
to distinguish between failure, insolvency, and bankruptcy 
so that the reader will know in which stage a firm is. 
Beginning at the first step and progressing forward, a firm 
goes from failure to insolvency to bankruptcy unless 
something is done to counteract the problem. 
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A economic failure is defined as a company that 
realized a rate of return on its invested capital that is 
significantly and continuously lower than the prevailing 
interest rates on similar investments (Altman p. 2). The 
significant point about failure is that the company can have 
this problem for years and still be able to pay its bills. 
As long as a firm can pay its current debts, it will be 
allowed to stay in business. Less than .4 percent of all 
companies that discontinue each year are due to economic 
failure (Argenti p. 49). 
If the problem of low rate of return is not dealt with 
properly, the firm will digress into the next stage: 
insolvency. Insolvency is divided into two categories: 
technical insolvency and permanent insolvency. Insolvency 
is often referred to as legal failure because it has all of 
the characteristics of failure plus the inability to meet 
its current debts even though total assets still exceed 
total liabilities (Ramaswami p. 65). If the problem seems 
to be only temporary, it is termed technical insolvency or 
"insolvency in an equity sense" (Altman p. 3). "Insolvency 
in a bankruptcy sense" is more serious (Argenti p. 49) 
because it is a more permanent situation. It means that 
total liabilities exceed total assets or that the real net 
worth of the firm is negative (Ramaswami p. 66). 
The next step is the final one and it deals with a 
formal declaration of the firm's bankruptcy. When the firm 
2 
realizes that the debts are just too much to handle and 
something needs to be done with the creditors, it will file 
a formal declaration with the bankruptcy court. If there is 
a problem but management does not notice, the creditors can 
file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against them. The 
formal definition of bankruptcy is an insolvent firm that 
has filed a petition for either liquidation or 
reorganization under the court's supervision (Altman p. 3). 
If a company is valued more alive then dead, it reorganizes 
rather than liquidates (Platt p. 6). Without the formality 
of filing, bankruptcy and insolvency are virtually 
synonymous (Argenti p. 49). 
Business failure is not necessarily a bad thing. It is 
just a status that if not handled properly will digress into 
a very serious problem: bankruptcy, the ultimate business 
failure (Platt p. 6). The point to' remember is that not all 
firms that fail are discontinued; if the manager can 
recognize the problem and correct it, the firm may recover 
(Platt p. 116). If the firm deteriorates from unrecognized 
problems, it will have to be discontinued (WeintraUb p. 1). 
This is much like the cancer analogy made previously, if the 
body deteriorates because of the undiscovered causes of 
cancer, the body will inevitably die. 
The need to study causes of corporate failure are 
obvious then. If an entrepreneur or manager of a large firm 
wants to succeed, he can choose to learn and understand the 
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causes of failure and then deal with them properly. Success 
ultimately balances failure (Platt p. 15) because if the 
symptoms are dealt with properly the possibility of success 
is increased. On the other hand, if the causes are ignored, 
the possibility of failure increases. 
The need to know is the basis of this study. The 
writer will attempt to show the causes of corporate failure 
in an easy to understand manner. If the firm recognizes the 
problems too late, it will have to understand the formal 
procedures of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code entitled 
Reorganization so this paper will also summarize that 
procedure. Before the reader can fully appreciate Chapter 
11, he must understand the evolution of the American 
bankruptcy laws. For this purpose, the writer will also 
include a brief history. To conclude this study, the 
writer will summarize case analysis that will show the 
corporate failure, the filing for Chapter 11 protection, and 
the succeeding of the firm through reorganization. 
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Chapter II 
What Causes Corporate Failure 
Just merely listing the causes of corporate failure is 
extremely hard to do because there are different ideas 
depending on who is asked, managers or creditors (Argenti 
p. 51). A corporation that fails could be a one man 
organization, a $100 million manufacturing firms, or any 
type in between (Stanley p. 107). Though it may be hard to 
do, this paper will attempt to summarize the major causes of 
corporate failure. The largest cause of failure seems to be 
being a young firm; the young firms seem to have a high 
propensity to fail, and the longer a firm exists, the 
smaller possibility of failure exists (Altman p. 21). The 
majority of small, new businesses that fail are between one 
and five years old; the reason for this is that a new firm 
has a competitive disadvantage to existing firms. The 
older, already existing firms have greater access to the 
money and capital markets so that they can withstand 
financial problems that the new firm has trouble 
controlling. The younger firms must rely on sources of 
capital that possess a small amount of capacity to finance 
the business. 
Many small firms discontinue its operations on a 
regular basis so the economic impact on society is little if 
any at all. The larger the firm going bankrupt, the more 
profound is the impact on society (Altman p. 1). If the 
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large firm fails, suppliers will have a significant decrease 
in demand, customers are inconvenienced even if sUbstitutes 
are available, and the public is hurt because of 
increased tax burdens. If a small firm fails, society 
will not be affected as badly as when a large firm fails 
because the smaller firm does not impact society in the same 
manner as the large firm when it is operating. Small firms 
usually do not have that many suppliers or customers, so not 
that many people will be affected by its failure. A small 
firm can fail in an industry and another small firm can 
replace it rather easily. If a larger firm fails in an 
industry, it cannot be instantly replaced by a firm of 
identical size. Therefore, the fact remains that a small 
firm's failure does not hurt society as much as a larger 
firm's failure. In this thesis, though, both a large 
failure and a small failure will be treated equally because 
both firms have similar causes of failure and they both 
reorganize under Chapter 11 in the same manner. 
It was mentioned previously that the list of causes of 
corporate failure was long, but really there are only two 
major factors that cause a corporation to fail: poor 
management and inadequate finances. All other causes stem 
directly from one of these two problems. Success of a 
business is virtually guaranteed if it has a good management 
team and adequate financing to complement the firm's capital 
(Barrickman p. 15). Poor management can mean a few 
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different things; it could mean management just does not 
possess the skills needed to be successful or it could mean 
that management is dishonest in some way. By dishonest, the 
writer means that the manager uses corporate funds for his 
own personal use. Though this happens some, not all 
bankruptcy is due to dishonesty. only five to ten percent 
of all bankruptcies are due to a dishonest manager (Stanley 
p. 110-112). Dun and Bradstreet were quoted as saying that 
in "90 percent of the bankruptcy cases you will find a 'lack 
of experience' and 'incompetence' as the causes." The 
second cause of failure was stated as inadequate financing 
and by this the writer means that the small businesses were 
inefficient at current market condition (Stanley 117). The 
inefficiencies stem from the lack of opportunity to receive 
loans in order to pay debts; or on the other hand, if the 
young firm can receive the loan, the interest rates are much 
too high to afford. "Most failures are unjustifiable 
entries into business aided in most cases by the 
indiscriminate and careless granting of credit" (Stanley p. 
107). The credit companies are part of the problem, if they 
were more cautious of who they lent money to, the inability 
to make payments would happen less frequently. 
Management incompetence causes the majority of 
corporate failures; but to narrow those causes, two 
classifications are made: external causes, and internal 
causes (Barrickman p. 12). The external causes are listed 
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under management incompetence because it is the manager's 
inability to adapt to or the lack of skill to handle the 
external forces. The internal forces are directly related 
to the manager's incompetence. 
The external section contains many problems that could 
be more easily handled if the management of the firm was 
better prepared. Extensive competition can cause a major 
problem for the firm. Normal competition is usually 
beneficial because it keeps the company "on its toes" 
(Barrickman p. 13). If the competition gets too strong and 
the price wars get too substantial, the larger, stronger 
firms will inevitably destroy the smaller, weaker firms. A 
strategy that could be used, that may be beneficial or not, 
is to merge with a major competitor. 
The biggest external factor that causes corporate 
failure is change--the company's inability to adequately 
respond to change. The company is not acting in isolation 
so it must be ready to change (Argenti p. 128). The factor 
of change can be broken up into many sUbsections so that it 
can be easily understood. 
Bad economic activity or a change in the business cycle 
is a possible external cause of corporate failure. A 
recession or depression are bad for a firm because they 
cause lower prices, drops in sales, or slower collection of 
debts. All of these things make the revenues gained much 
lower and it in turn creates a lower cash account. The most 
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-potent economic activity upon corporate failure is the 
"credit squeeze" (Argenti p. 51). A credit squeeze is a 
period of "tight money" where credit is rationed to those 
firms who are believed to be the best risks. These best 
risks and not small firms or firms that are already in 
danger, but those firms who are larger and stronger (Argenti 
p. 52). This fact will solidify the point that the majority 
of failures seem to be small firms. If a firm cannot 
receive credit when it needs it, it will not be able to 
operate in our competitive society. Even if the small firm 
could receive the credit it needed, it would not be able to 
afford it anyway. When money is tight, the interest rates 
rise to a point where only the larger, richer firms can 
afford to take loans which causes an anti-small, anti-
marginal market (Argenti p. 52). with a management that is 
prepared for anything, this really would not be a problem 
because they would have anticipated the problem and 
controlled for it. 
Change in public demand may also cause a firm to fail. 
If the firm sells an item that is an anachronism, it can 
never be successful because it will not have a demand for 
its product. A very good example of this is the "buggy whip 
maker"; when new forms of transportation were created, if 
the buggy whip maker did not adapt with the change, his 
business would soon fail due to the lack of demand for buggy 
whips. To be successful, a firm must sell what the public 
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wants and can afford (Barrickman p. 13). If management was 
competent, they would be ready to adapt to change. In these 
times of change, management must be prepared to adapt and to 
diversify. with a prepared Research and Development team, 
the firm would always be ready to strive onward despite the 
change in society. 
other changes in society also have a negative effect on 
the firm's success. If society's attitude toward work 
changes, the management will have to be ready to change. If 
the attitude changes from the want of more money to 
participation and job satisfaction, the management needs to 
have programs ready to keep employees happy (Argenti p. 
129). If there is anything management does not want, it 
would be an adverse act of labor (Barrickman p. 14). Labor 
unions were created to keep the workers happy; they are 
skilled at bargaining so the management of the firm must be 
skilled also because a prolonged strike could devastatingly 
hurt production and be detrimental to the firm's existence 
(Barrickman p. 14). The last societal change that affects 
the firm is a change in technology (Argenti p. 130). If 
there is a new cheaper way to produce, but the management is 
too incompetent to notice or too cheap to care, the firm's 
profit margin per unit may decrease because other firm's 
prices are lower because they are using the new technology. 
A well managed company will be able to adapt to any type of 
change no matter how great it is. 
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Normal everyday occurrences or just plain "bad luck" 
can be detrimental to the firm's success if not handled 
properly. Failure due to this cause should never happen 
because all firms are subjected to the same daily 
occurrences (Argenti p. 137). Managers should be able to 
foresee possible strokes of bad luck and prepare for them. 
Examples of the natural occurrences are fires, earthquakes, 
explosions and floods. The only way a manager can really 
prepare for any of these is to take a preventive approach by 
being watchful and choosing a good location for the firm 
(Barrickman p. 15). The possibility of financial failure is 
greatly reduced by having insurance policies covering 
natural phenomena. Though even with insurance, if one of 
these phenomena happen, there will be down time due to 
rebuilding which will cause lost profits and increase the 
possibility of failure. If the correct insurance policy is 
purchased, even the lost profits can be insured. This 
external cause is a very serious one and can be controlled 
adequately if the management acquires the right insurance. 
The last external cause of corporate failure to be 
discussed here is due to governmental acts whether it be 
local, state or federal (Argenti p. 129). The government 
may decide to pass some legislation in your area of 
production that will hurt your business. Examples of these 
governmental acts would be legislation concerning new tax 
structures or legislation concerning trade practices 
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(Barrickman p. 14). Other governmental acts that may 
indirectly hurt business may be expiration of a patent for 
production or the initiation of tariffs. Management must be 
able to adapt or these governmental acts may cause its firm 
to fail. 
The preceding external causes were detrimental to the 
firm due to the management's inability to adapt to them. 
The following causes are internal in nature and are directly 
caused by management's incompetence. The trouble with the 
preceding statement is that no one really agrees what 
management incompetence means (Argenti p. 3). Some people 
agree that if the management team is well trained, the only 
way a firm can fail is sheer bad luck. It is agreed that 
management incompetence includes a lack of experience in the 
field, having a familiarity with the product market but 
unbalanced experience in one or more of the management 
functions, a lack of ability to anticipate unfavorable 
industry developments, and/or hubris which leads to the 
underestimation of the competition (Ramaswami p. 66). A 
common belief exists that a good manager will rarely make 
the same fatal mistake as a bad manager, but if he does he 
has the good management skills to help him protect the 
company (Argenti p. 123). Throughout history, studies have 
shown that there are six areas of internal management 
incompetence that will cause failure. Those six will be 
summarized in the following paragraphs. 
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The first four have to do with the CEO and the Board of 
Directors. First of all, CEO's that dominate their 
colleagues, called the "one man rule", rather than lead them 
is harmful to the firm. The CEO will hear no advice or 
allow any discussion so that every decision is one man's 
opinion (Argenti p. 123). An example of this is Apple, Inc. 
and its CEO John Sculley. Sculley made all of the decisions 
for Apple by himself, he never consulted his other managers. 
Apple's sturdiness in the industry started to fall until 
Sculley figured out his mistake and delegated much of the 
responsibility to the newly elected Executive Vice-President 
Michael Spindler (Buell p. 86). The second defective area 
is having the same individual fill both the CEO and the 
Chairman of the Board positions. This defect may be the 
most serious because if you draw a management tree you will 
find that managers are responsible to the manager directly 
above them (Argenti p. 126). To whom is the CEO responsible 
to? If he is also the Chairman of the Board, he is 
responsible to himself so there is no one to keep him 
honest. Apple Inc. and Sculley also had this problem but 
have yet to correct it (Buell p. 56). 
A non-participating Board of Directors supplements the 
previously mentioned areas of management defects. If the 
inside directors do not know what is going on, they will not 
help the CEO even if he asked for their help. Outside 
directors are able to notice problems because they are 
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unbiased towards the firm's inside operations. If those 
outside directors are competent, they will be able to supply 
possible actions to fix them; but if they are incompetent, 
they will be as unable to help the CEO as the inside 
directors. The functional directors from within as well as 
the CEO need to pay closer attention to the surroundings of 
their company (Argenti p. 124). For the board to be 
effective, both the inside directors as well as the outside 
directors must be competent but more importantly they have 
to participate in operations by giving the CEO feedback. 
The fourth defective area of management is having an 
unbalanced top team. Members of the top team include 
directors, senior executives, and advisors below the 
director level (Argenti p. 124). The whole point of having 
a "team" is so there will be discussions and debates about 
things within the company. The definition of unbalanced in 
this context concerns the amount of education and skill. No 
one with the same skill as the CEO will question his 
authority. The best top team will have a make up of many 
different areas of expertise, e.g. accounting, marketing, 
law, human resources. That way every manager will have a 
different opinion about things. 
The last two defective areas have to do with the 
management in a general sense. The fifth defect is a lack 
of depth in the management. This runs hand in hand with the 
others but would be rather weak if studied independently 
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(Argenti p. 125). This would be hard to detect and if you 
detected it, it would be because the other areas were 
evident. The last area of defect causing management 
incompetence is having a weak financial function. 
Inadequate control of financial information and accounting 
figures would cause the management to be very ineffective 
(Argenti p. 125). Even if the finances were strong, if 
there was no financial director on the board, there would be 
no financial input during decision-making. 
The internal non-financial causes of corporate failure 
can be due to unwise decisions by the management that do not 
deal with the handling of money. An example of this would 
be a promotion of an individual into a key position not 
because of his qualifications but because he is the CEO's 
son (Barrickman p. 16). Adequate consideration needs to be 
given to each promotion decision and the promotion should go 
to the individual that would make the firm better. Another 
example of an unwise decision that could possibly cause 
corporate failure is the decision to expand the firm when it 
is not possible. Many firms are very successful as long as 
they are content with being small (Barrickman p. 16). Two 
prime examples of trying to expand unsuccessfully are 
overtrading and "the big project." Overtrading means the 
management underestimated the amount they need to borrow for 
the expansion or the time it may take to arrange the loan 
(Argenti p. 132). If the manager overtrades, he may 
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increase turnover at the expense of the profit margin per 
unit. "The big project" causes a problem when the 
management incorrectly forecasts the costs and revenues so 
that the whole project is estimated incorrectly (Argenti p. 
134). Examples of a "big project" are a merger, a 
diversification, and an expansion. If any of the decisions 
regarding these projects are based on incorrect information, 
it could be detrimental to the firm. 
Another internal cause of corporate failure is the 
decision to have operating amounts that are inefficient. 
Examples of these are purchasing, production, sales and 
inventories. Inefficient purchasing means that the firm 
does not buy its inputs in bulk and therefore cannot receive 
the discount (Barrickman p. 16). If the firm's competitors 
buy in bulk, they get to take advantage of the discount and 
can afford to sell their products at a lower price. If the 
firm lowers its price to compete without receiving the 
discount, it will lose profit margin every time it sells a 
good. Inefficient production is merely not producing that 
quantity of goods that would be in an economic equilibrium. 
If a firm does this, it will raise the price of the good and 
it will be harder to compete in the industry (Barrickman 
p. 16). Having inefficient sales will have the same effect 
as inefficient production. If the firm produces the 
equilibrium quantity but cannot sell it due to bad or no 
advertising, the prices of the goods will eventually rise. 
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Bad advertising means inefficient salespeople, poor 
supervision, or inadequate advertising in terms of improper 
use of the distribution channel (Barrickman p. 17). The 
product, no matter how good it really is, will stay on the 
shelf due to this. Inefficient inventory levels merely 
means that when the firm wants to sell a good but there is 
nothing in stock. This can be due to many factors e.g. 
underproduction, inefficient delivery or a bad decision to 
keep a low level of inventory. 
Now that the nonfinancial internal causes have been 
explained, it is time to discuss the financial internal 
causes. All of these financial causes are direct results of 
a poor financial management team. Incorrectly estimating 
the capital needs of the firm could be detrimental; if the 
team decides to put too much money in bonds and too little 
in stock, the firm could be put into a bind (Barrickman p. 
17) • 
A major financial decision is whether to use debt 
(bonds) or equity (stocks) when financing operations. When 
checking this the financial manager will study a calculated 
figure called financial average which is a ratio of debt or 
equity to net income (Platt p. 14). The decision of which 
to use, debt or equity, is very important because it affects 
future earnings and it increases the possibility of 
bankruptcy. The decision is a difficult one because though 
bonds are cheaper than stock, stock is much safer 
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(Barrickman p. 17). 
The managers must decide what is best for them cheaper 
or safer and in what amounts. If they decide to issue 
bonds, they have to decide whether to use short term or long 
term bonds. This is a major decision because they are 
gambling with the interest rates so they have to carefully 
study the current market before making the decision (Platt 
p. 15). Bond issues should only be sold if the firm 
foresees the ability to meet future obligations because even 
if they can meet current fixed charges if they cannot meet 
future maturities it may fail (Barrickman p. 18). 
If the firm decides to use equity and issue stock, it 
also has many other decisions to make. If too many shares 
of stock are sold, it will be hard to report a sizeable 
earnings per share and an increase in the price of that 
stock will result (Platt p. 14). If the company issues 
equity beyond a prudent level, it may find itself vulnerable 
to errors, bad luck, but most importantly to normal business 
hazards (Argenti p. 136). If the firm is vulnerable to 
normal business hazards, they have an increased chance of 
failing. 
The firm's financial team must also decide about the 
amount of current liabilities, loans with banks or other 
creditors (Barrickman p. 18). A wrong or misinformed 
decision increases the probability for the failure of the 
firm. Most small firms have an excessive floating debt, too 
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many current liability, and often times it is not 
beneficial. If an entrepreneur tries to finance the entire 
firm through bank loans, he may get himself into trouble if 
everything does not go smoothly. 
Another internal financial problem stems from the over-
extension of credit. Making a sale is very important so 
many firms allow credit sales. The problem is that if the 
firm offered too much credit to anyone customer and the 
debtor fails, it may very well fail also (Barrickman p. 19). 
If the firm finds itself in a bind and needs cash but cannot 
collect from its debtors, it cannot pay its creditors and 
again may fail. Another problem that complements the 
inability to collect needed funds is the cash flow cycle. 
When purchasing and selling, the firm's management must 
anticipate the cycle and ensure its effectiveness. If the 
expenses come due prior to the revenues being collected, the 
firm is in trouble (Platt p. 14). The firm must strive to 
keep a specific and adequate amount of current assets just 
in case the cycle gets messed up or is incorrectly 
anticipated. 
Having an unwise dividend policy could prove to be 
costly to a firm. If a firm is constantly expanding due to 
the sale of securities, management needs to realize that it 
is better to maintain a regular, liberal dividend rather 
than constantly increasing it (Barrickman p. 19). The 
management should also decide that if the profits begin to 
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decline, they should cut dividends opposed to keeping it the 
same. If the firm keeps the same dividend and profits 
decline, it will begin to lose capital with which to work. 
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Chapter III 
The History of Bankruptcy Law 
The previous section covered many causes of corporate 
failure that if considered by management would greatly 
reduce the chances of failing. If management decides not to 
consider them, they may be forced to file formally for 
bankruptcy. Before filing, management should understand 
what the bankruptcy laws are. One way of understanding 
today's laws is to study how the old laws evolved throughout 
the years. This section of the text will attempt to briefly 
explain the old bankruptcy law. 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the earliest bankruptcy 
law, contained no provision for discharging debts; if after 
liquidation and distribution the debts were not paid in 
full, the estate remained in debt until they were paid. 
This caused a problem because it continued to punish the 
debtor after bankruptcy. The newer laws try to be more 
understanding and to set up a system of discharge that would 
make both parties happy. The original law also did not 
provide any other remedy besides liquidation (Altman p. 5). 
Under the old law when a business filed bankruptcy, it was 
forced to discontinue. A system of reorganization did exist 
through equity receiverships, but it was very ineffective. 
Equity receiverships were developed to prevent disruptive 
seizures of property by dissatisfied creditors. In this 
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system, "receivers" were appointed by the bankruptcy court 
to manage the corporate property during the reorganization 
process (Altman p. 5). 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was replaced by the 
Bankruptcy Acts of 1933 and 1934 which were then revised by 
the Chandler Act of 1938. The new act of 1938 consisted of 
fourteen chapters. The first seven chapters dealt with the 
structure of the bankruptcy system. They established the 
federal district courts as the bankruptcy courts and they 
also defined the rights and duties of both the debtor and 
the creditors (stanley p. 10). Chapters VIII through XIII 
authorized special proceedings for certain circumstances. 
This act permitted debtors to seek reorganization in a more 
efficient manner than the equity receiverships (Barrickman 
p. 166). The two most important chapters in this act were 
Chapters X and XI. Chapter X contained a lengthy, elaborate 
set of rules for reorganization while Chapter XI covered 
unsecured debts in corporate bankruptcy cases. Chapters X 
and XI will be further discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
Chapter X required that large public firms file under 
this chapter and it provided relief from secured creditors 
(Ramaswami p. 85). A voluntary petition could be filed by 
the debtor or an involuntary petition could be filed by the 
creditors provided there are three or more of them and the 
claim amounted to $5,000 or more. The petition was required 
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to state why relief could not be obtained under Chapter XI 
(Altman p. 7). This chapter automatically provided for the 
appointment of an disinterested, independent trustee to 
assume control of operations for the firm during the 
proceedings rather than leaving the existing management in 
control. The trustee had a number of duties including 
developing a reorganization plan that is fair and feasible 
to all parties involved, and running the day-to-day 
operations of the business. The trustee could delegate the 
latter to a new management team if so desired (Altman p. 7). 
The delegation normally went to new management because the 
old management's incompetence was the cause of the failure. 
Chapter XI provided relief for debtors who had 
unsecured creditors. It was designed to be used by small 
non-public firms needing protection from creditors, time to 
evaluate their unsecured debts and time to develop a 
repayment plan (Ramaswami p. 85). This proceeding was 
strictly voluntary and also provided for the appointment of 
a trustee. Chapter XI did permit existing management to 
stay in control if they wanted (Altman p. 6). The 
distressed firm's petition for reorganization usually 
contained a preliminary plan for financial relief. The 
prospect of continued management control and reduced 
financial obligations made this more attractive that Chapter 
X. Many firms required to file under Chapter X tried to 
file under Chapter XI because it was much more beneficial. 
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-The problem was that it caused three more problems for the 
creditors: 1) secured debt and equity shareholder rights 
were not protected very well; 2} the SEC was empowered by 
the courts to determine the value of the bankrupt firm and 
to protect shareholders, but it tended to overestimate the 
value hurting creditors; and 3) existing management was 
allowed to stay in control even though they may have been 
the cause of the bankruptcy (Ramaswami p. 85). 
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Chapter IV 
An Introduction to the Federal Bankruptcy Act 
Many times when a firm fails, it is forced to file for 
bankruptcy, but there really are other options. Business 
failures can end in a multitude of different ways. The firm 
can continue under the same name in two ways: an out of 
court settlement or through a Chapter 11 reorganization 
(Ramaswami p. 80). If the creditors decide to settle out of 
court, they have two possible offers for the debtor. The 
creditor can offer an extension which is a mere postponement 
of the payment date or a composition which is an acceptance 
of a smaller amount of money than what is due as payment in 
full. Extension and composition are designed to keep 
distressed firms in business and alleviate court costs; the 
only problem with them is that the offers for the two must 
be voluntary acts by the creditors (Ramaswami p. 81). 
studies have shown that extension is favored because it 
consists of an agreement for payment in full. The second 
alternative that a firm has so that it can remain in 
business using the same name is reorganization which is 
covered by Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
which will be covered in greater detail later in the thesis. 
other possible results of business failures are a 
merger with or acquisition of a competing firm or the firm 
can merely cease to exist (Ramaswami p. 80). If a firm 
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chooses to merge,it usually takes the name of the other 
firm. If it decides to acquire a competing firm rather than 
merge with it, it will usually keep its original name. 
sometimes under both choices a neutral new name may be 
decided. 
A firm can cease to exist in two separate ways: an out 
of court settlement or through a Chapter 7 liquidation 
(Ramaswami p. 80). In an out of court settlement, there can 
either be a common law assignment where the assets of the 
distressed firm are assigned to an independent trustee who 
sells them and then distributes the money to the creditors 
or there is a statutory legal assignment. Chapter 7 is also 
a method and it is covered by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978. Since this thesis is concerned with failure, filing, 
and success after filing, Chapter 7 will not be covered. 
Before describing Chapter 11 in any detail, it must be 
noted that not every failing firm ends up in Federal 
bankruptcy court; the firm may simply shut down with or 
without the agreement of creditors (Stanley p. 107). If the 
causes of corporate failure mentioned previously in this 
paper are taken seriously, the firm can be turned around and 
possibly become successful again. Though, if the causes go 
unrecognized or are ignored, bankruptcy is inevitably the 
next step. Bankruptcy is the formal process that deals with 
the informal problem of failure. In the United States, it 
is taken very seriously and is controlled statutorily by the 
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Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 
The bankruptcy process was established to resolve in a 
fair and orderly manner the conflicts in interest that arise 
among the creditors of a businessman who cannot pay his 
debts (Stanley p. 9). Our bankruptcy law tries to protect 
the creditors from being cheated by controlling which claims 
receive payment first. without the law, the creditors would 
race to the debtor and some of them would be paid in full 
while others received nothing at all. The legalized 
procedure tries to alleviate this problem by ensuring that 
creditors are treated fairly (Stanley p. 9). 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act also protects the debtor firm 
be setting up a process where it can still exist after 
filing for bankruptcy. This process could give new life to 
a dying company because it will help set up a plan for 
paying debts (Platt p. 116). without the law, the firm 
would most likely be forced to liquidate and then there is 
no chance for continued operations. So the law has become 
an opportunity for relief for the honest but unfortunate 
debtor (Stanley p. 10). 
The problem with this legislation is that it has set up 
a process that could be used by an unscrupulous firm to "get 
out of " paying its debts. The debtor firm could easily 
conceal its assets and then file for protection from 
antagonizing creditors. It would then be discharged from 
its debts but still retain its property (Barrickman p. 141). 
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One must remember, though, that the act is a federal law so 
violation of it by concealing assets is a federal offense 
punishable by a fine up to $5,000. 
Despite the previously mentioned drawback, the federal 
bankruptcy act is a good piece of legislation because it 
formalizes a process that could otherwise get out of hand. 
A business may be more beneficial if it is given some time 
to earn the money to pay its creditors rather than 
liquidating its assets. On the other hand, it may not be 
more beneficial--that is the decision to be made before 
filing. If the firm decides it would probably be more 
beneficial staying in business, Chapter 11 covering 
reorganization is the chapter under which it needs to file. 
This process is important to understand because if it is 
done correctly, the firm can possibly survive after filing. 
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Chapter V 
Reorganization Under Chapter 11 
Chapter 11 is the part of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 
that is entitled Reorganization. Chapter 11 permits a 
person or business to obtain protection from creditors while 
it attempts to reorganize, or rehabilitate itself. When 
creating Chapter 11, the revisers basically combined Chapter 
X and Chapter XI of the old law (Ramaswami p. 87). To be 
eligible, the petitioner must be a legal "person" and cannot 
be a stockbroker, a commodity broker, an insurance company, 
a bank, or a savings and loan institution. If filed by a 
debtor, it must be in good faith and not for the intention 
of providing relief to an ineligible entity (Williamson p. 
15). A petitioner could not have received relief or been a 
party to a dismissed bankruptcy case within 180 days prior 
to the filing. The only financial restriction is that the 
benefit received from filing must outweigh the costs and no 
size restriction is placed on the petitioner. It can be a 
small firm, a large firm or anywhere in between (Williamson 
p. 1). 
The primary purpose of Chapter 11 is to facilitate 
reorganization and it may also be used to carry out an 
orderly debtor controlled liquidation (Williamson p. 13). 
The Reform Act of 1978 made it less stringent to file under 
Chapter 11 because legislators made it unnecessary to prove 
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-insolvency prior to filing (Ramaswami p. 20). Today, a poor 
actual or expected cash flow or a mere inability to pay 
creditors is an adequate reason to file; the new law also 
allows the existing management, if competent, to stay in 
control of operations during the proceedings. Sometimes, a 
firm files for the purposes of voiding leases, contracts or 
lawsuits that threaten its existence. An example of 
attempting to void a lawsuit through filing is Texaco's 
filing for reorganization trying to void Pennzoil's $10.3 
billion lawsuit. 
This chapter offers debtors with one or more of those 
previously mentioned causes an opportunity to "freeze" their 
debts while they work on a plan of reorganization with their 
suppliers, institutional lenders, equity security holders, 
and employees (Weintraub p. 1). Virtually all firms who 
file have three similar characteristics: 1) the firm's 
existing or future claims exceed its assets, 2) new funds 
need to be raised and 3) problems causing the failure need 
to be found and corrected (Ramaswami p. 82). If these 
things cannot be done, reorganization will not be 
successful. Many people do not think it is possible to be a 
successful firm after going through bankruptcy proceedings, 
but if reorganization is taken seriously, it can have very 
high returns. 
Chapter 11 proceedings may be broken into two different 
phases: 1) prior to confirmation of the plan which is six 
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to eight months long depending on severity of failure, and 
2) after the plan which is normally three to five years 
(williamson p. 3). The first step in the first phase of the 
proceedings is the filing of a petition with the federal 
Bankruptcy Clerk that normally costs $500. A voluntary 
proceeding is when the debtor files and subjects himself to 
the law where he has no legal duty to or cannot be forced 
to. In an inVOluntary proceeding, the debtor is subjected 
to the law by its creditors. For the creditors to file, 
there must be more than three different named creditors 
unless the debtor only has twelve or less creditors, then 
only one creditor is needed (Williamson p. 13). In the 
involuntary proceeding, the debtor is issued a subpoena and 
petition and the hearing date is set. Upon filing, the 
court can either dismiss the case due to lack of evidence 
that the debtor is indeed insolvent or it can adjudicate the 
debtor bankrupt (Barrickman p. 129). 
When the debtor files voluntarily, it must file a 
schedule of assets, a schedule of liabilities, and a 
statement of financial affairs. Upon filing the debtor 
becomes a "debtor in possession" of the same business with 
the same board of directors. From that point forward, the 
debtor in possession runs the business in the same way as 
before but with new books and a new bank account as all old 
secured debts are frozen (Weintraub p. 2). The debtor is 
authorized to operate itself in normal everyday business 
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worry about paying all of the debts that come due, it will 
never regain its stature so that it can participate in this 
competitive society. The primary responsibility of 
reorganization is to relieve the burden of the debtor's 
immediate liabilities and to realign the capital structure 
so that the same problem will not happen again (Altman p. 
3). The automatic stay feature helps the debtor meet this 
major goal. 
The automatic stay provides the debtor with a few 
months to make its bill payments. The long term relief 
comes in the form of reorganization, where the firm 
continues to function in the present or revised form of the 
firm (Williamson p. 3). The reorganization may be done by 
the extension of time to pay creditors or the total 
restructuring of the business. Which ever choice the debtor 
makes, it is spelled out in the reorganization plan. When 
creating the plan, the debtor must do it in a manner that 
will so adjust the debts in order to reach the primary 
objective of reorganization--to reestablish itself as a 
successful firm (Weintraub p. 2). 
In most cases, the existing management remains in 
possession and in control of operations and assets; the only 
exceptions to this rule are in the instance of fraud, 
dishonesty or incompetence, in which a United states trustee 
is appointed to take control. In normal circumstances, when 
a trustee is not appointed, an examiner is appointed to 
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investigate the debtor's affairs (Williamson p. 14). A 
committee of unsecured creditors, made up usually of the 
largest ones, is created to help in the devising of the 
reorganization plan. The creditors are divided into classes 
of importance and committees are formed for each class; 
after the plan is proposed, the committees vote on its 
ratification (Altman p. 8). 
The major portion of the reorganization process is the 
plan proposal made by the debtor within the first 120 days 
after the commencement of the case. If the debtor has not 
issued a plan within those 120 days or the plan has not been 
accepted by the class committees within 180 days, the 
classes can propose a counter plan. The plan must classify 
all claims and interests by the classes as the plan is 
accepted or rejected by the classes (Williamson p. 14). If 
a class is not impaired, its interests or claims are not 
diminished or substantially changed (Williamson p. 15), by 
the plan, it accepts it. A claim is a right to payment and 
an interest is an equity security right of a shareholder. 
If a class receives nothing from the plan, it usually 
rejects it. To accept the plan, two thirds of the class 
committee must ratify it; if less than that number accepts, 
the plan is rejected (Altman p. 8). Not all classes need to 
accept the plan for it to be implemented; as long as one 
class accepts the plan it may still be used as will be 
discussed later in more detail. 
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In order to be able to vote, a creditor's claim or a 
shareholder's interest must be allowed, which means that it 
must be filed with the bankruptcy court within the time 
specified (Williamson p. 15). Even if all the classes vote 
to accept the plan, it does not become official until it is 
confirmed by the court. There is always a court hearing in 
every reorganization case for the purpose of the class vote 
and the court confirmation (Barrickman p. 153). Prior to 
confirmation, the court must decide three things: 1) does 
the plan conform to the Bankruptcy Act? 2) is it fair and 
equitable to all classes of creditors? and 3) is the plan 
feasible? (Barrickman p. 154). 
Deciding the answer to the first question is quite 
simple because the Bankruptcy Act is written down for 
everyone to see. The other two questions may not be as easy 
to answer due to the vagueness in the definition of fair and 
feasible. By "fairness" the courts mean that the claims 
must be recognized in the order of their legal and 
contractual priority. The plan must meet the absolute 
priority rule which constitutes the rigid following of a 
list of priority rules including the rule that states that 
junior claimants cannot be paid until after all of the 
senior classes have been paid(Williamson p. 15). The 
primary test for fairness requires four steps: 1) estimate 
future sales, 2) analyze operating conditions in order to 
estimate future earnings, 3) determine the capitalization 
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rate to be applied to earnings in order to estimate the 
property value, and 4) determine the amounts of money to be 
distributed per claimant (Ramaswami p. 82). The fairness is 
considered from the standpoint of the creditor; if the 
previously mentioned four steps are feasible, the plan will 
be adjudicated fair to the creditors. 
By feasible, the courts merely mean capable of being 
accomplished. If the plan is impossible to be completed, 
the court will not confirm it. The primary test for 
feasibility contains two steps: 1) are fixed charges in 
income after reorganization amply covered by earnings?, and 
2) will some action need to be taken to ensure improvement 
of earning power? (Ramaswami p. 83). If the court decides 
that the issued plan is fair, feasible, complies with the 
law, and has been accepted by the classes of creditors, it 
will confirm the plan. 
In a specific situation, the plan can be confirmed 
without being accepted by the classes of creditors. That 
situation is called a "cramdown confirmation"; if one or 
more classes rejects the plan it can still be confirmed 
provided that at least one class accepts it (Williamson p. 
15). During a cramdown confirmation, the court must find 
that statutory requirements have been met and that the plan 
is not discriminatory to any of the classes. If every class 
rejects the plan, not even the cramdown provision can 
confirm the plan. 
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Upon confirmation, phase two of the Chapter 11 
proceedings begin. This phase is less formal because it is 
where the actual reorganization, according to the plan, 
begins. The major occurrence during phase two is the 
discharge of the debtor's debts which happens upon the 
court's confirmation. The ironic part is that the discharge 
remains valid even if the debtor fails to meet the plan; the 
only way a discharge becomes invalid is if it is revoked by 
the court. The only debts not discharged are those payments 
that are necessary for a creditor's survival. 
The trustee that was appointed at the beginning of the 
case now has a particular job to do. After court approval, 
the trustee is required to send two things to every party 
affected by the plan: a summary of the plan or plans 
approved by the court and the opinion of the judge 
(Barrickman p. 154). The only thing left is the carrying 
out of the plan. The debtor needs to implement and complete 
every provision in the plan. Finally, the plan must be 
consummated, a final accounting made, a final order entered, 
and the case is closed (Williamson p. 15). If the plan is 
implemented but the firm finds that it cannot complete it 
effectively, it can switch to the Chapter 7 proceedings of 
liquidation. 
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Chapter VI 
Effect of Reorganization on a Firm 
The key to a successful reorganization is the firm's 
ability to start over with a new capital structure 
(Ramaswami p. 70). The firm will need financing just as it 
did before an studies show that despite the stigma of 
bankruptcy, debtors have no real difficulty receiving credit 
after reorganizing (stanley p. 3). It is a matter of 
management just going out and securing finances from bankers 
or general creditors. During the year 1987, 17,142 firms 
filed for protection under Chapter 11 and as of 1988, 6722 
of them were still in business under the same ownership 
(Ramaswami p. 70). Successful reorganization is very 
possible, the management just needs to work hard. 
Entrepreneurs may need to work harder than the managers of 
the larger firms because statistics show that if revenues 
exceed $100 million, 69 percent of the firms stay in 
business but if the revenues are less than $25 million only 
30 percent survive reorganization (Ramaswami p. 70). 
The resources available on this topic are very scarce. 
Most of the extant literature on the performance of bankrupt 
firms deals with the effect on the firm under the old 
Chapter X law or with the performance prior to the 
bankruptcy (Ramaswami p. 92). For this reason, this topic 
will be viewed in a different manner. In the following 
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section, a case analysis showing the progression from 
corporate failure through reorganization of an actual firm 
will be given. 
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Chapter VII 
Eastern Airlines: A Case study 
Eastern was established in 1928 by an old World War I 
hero named Eddie Rickenbacker (Ziemba p. 1d). The firm was 
instantly plagued by labor turmoil: Rickenbacker was not 
fond of spending money for employees, customers, or new 
planes. Early in its existence, Eastern had some problems, 
but nonetheless it prospered as air travel grew (Bernstein 
p.22). 
Upon Rickenbacker's retirement in the 1960's, his 
replacements as President of Eastern wanted to purchase the 
new technologically better planes. Eastern's debt grew and 
in 1975 when Frank Borman, former astronaut, took the helm, 
the bills began to come due (Ziemba p. 1d). When he took 
the helm it was $1 million in debt and in 1978, Borman 
ordered an entire new fleet of planes priced at $1.4 billion 
(Bernstein p. 22). At about this same time, the United 
states Congress deregulated the airline industry and the 
problems grew (Ziemba p. 1d). 
Borman kept purchasing planes but did nothing to 
address any of Eastern's major problems. Eastern was at the 
brink of bankruptcy in 1983 when Borman persuaded the 
employees to take a cut in pay in return for 25 percent of 
the company and a few seats on the Board of Directors 
(Ziemba p. 1d). Borman was only willing to offer the deal 
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when the union threatened to strike due to the pay cuts. 
Borman tried other ways of survival but they all failed; he 
was forced to bargain with the employees. 
In the summer of 1985, Eastern's profits hit a record 
level and everything seemed fine. The management reopened 
negotiations with employees and raised their wages to the 
original levels (Bernstein p. 31). No one in the management 
noticed that the market for travel was sort of in a slump 
and Eastern may again be in financial trouble. In 1986 its 
debt hit $2.5 billion and bankruptcy again loomed overhead. 
Borman offered an ultimatum to the union leaders to get them 
to agree to new concessionary cuts. If they did not accept 
the wage decrease, he would declare bankruptcy (Bernstein p. 
33). When the leaders refused the wage cut, he consulted 
the banks with no avail. On February 23, 1986, Frank 
Lorenzo with the help of Texas Air Corporation, purchased 
Eastern Airlines for $676 million. Borman was asked to 
resign and was replaced by Lorenzo. 
Lorenzo felt that he had the financial capabilities to 
take Eastern where Borman could not. Also, he felt the 
union problems were not as substantial for him; if Eastern's 
unions did not buckle, he could merely paint Eastern's 
planes in Continental Airlines, another subsidiary of Texas 
Air, colors and hire new, nonunion workers (Bernstein p. 
55). Lorenzo, upon taking over the helm at Eastern, had no 
intention of keeping pace with the rising industry wages. 
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For a few years, Lorenzo fought with the unions trying to 
play one against the other. Financial problems began to 
grown along with the union problems. On March 9, 1989, the 
unions struck and Eastern was forced to do something it had 
been threatened with for decades: file for Chapter 11 
protection (Ziemba p. Id). 
Chapter 2 of this thesis listed causes of corporate 
failure; this Eastern Airlines example is ideal because it 
incorporated more than one of those causes. Chapter 2 
stated that management incompetence is the major cause of 
corporate failure because it causes other internal and 
external causes to occur. Eastern Airlines failed because 
of Lorenzo's, as well as Eastern's past presidents', 
incompetence when dealing with unions. It was also stated 
in that chapter that an adverse act of labor was another 
cause. At Eastern the unions were skilled in labor 
negotiations and management was not as skilled so something 
had to be done. Management should be able to recognize a 
problem and fix it; in this case, Eastern's management 
should have hired a skilled negotiator and/or possibly given 
in to the union's demands. The union's demands were not 
ludicrous as they rose as the industry's wages rose. 
Possibly Lorenzo was incompetent because he did not notice 
When the union was right. He refused to deal with the 
unions and ignored their demands. In result, Eastern 
failed. 
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Borman's incompetence went farther than unskilled labor 
negotiations; he took on a ridiculous amount of debt in 
order to "better" the company. If it was not for Lorenzo's 
buyout, Eastern would have folded in 1986. The problem of 
when to use and not to use debt was also listed as an 
internal, financial cause of corporate failure. 
Lorenzo noticed that the debt was too high, and that 
Eastern needed funds. He sold some of Eastern's assets to 
gain some cash, e.g. the Northeast Shuttle and Eastern's 
Latin American routes in 1989 (Ziemba p. 1d). An investor 
group tried to purchase Eastern in 1989 in the same manner 
as Lorenzo but was unsuccessful. Several different options 
were listed earlier as choices for a firm after filing for 
bankruptcy: reorganization, merger/acquisitions, or 
liquidation. If the investment group had been successful 
Eastern would have chosen the second option. Since the 
buyout failed, Lorenzo decided to use the first option. 
Eastern's creditors were divided into classes and the 
committees were appointed. The committees supported Lorenzo 
for thirteen months but were finally convinced that he would 
not create a viable plan. Alan Boyd, a chairman for one of 
the committees, said that even after the thirteen months of 
support, "Eastern's present management was incompetent" 
(McKenna p. 78). Since the March 9 filing, the present 
management had lost nearly $1.2 billion that the creditors 
blamed on Lorenzo. 
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Lorenzo, along with other managers, blamed the $1.2 
billion loss on the increase in fuel prices, the decrease in 
air travel, and the requirement forcing Eastern to keep its 
South American routes operating (McKenna p. 79). In April 
of 1990, Bankruptcy Judge Burton Lifland, with the help of 
the creditor committees, concluded that Lorenzo was indeed 
incompetent in dealing with Eastern's reorganization (Ziemba 
p. 1d). On April 18, Lifland appointed former Texas Air 
Corp. executive Martin R. Shugrue, Jr. as the United Sates 
trustee (McKenna p. 78). Shugrue's duties would include 
operating Eastern on a day-to-day basis and also to come up 
with a reorganization plan. In defense of this appointment, 
Lorenzo came up with still another plan but was again 
unsuccessful. Lorenzo's new plan offered creditors thirty 
cents on every dollar (McKenna p. 79). 
When a judge appoints a trustee, he is aiming for a 
successful reorganization. Eastern's case was not like 
that; Shugrues's promotional campaigns failed in luring back 
customers so that Eastern's business did not increase. 
Shugrue's reorganization plan was also unsuccessful due to 
another economic downturn and rising fuel costs. Finally, 
Eastern accepted defeat and on January 19, 1991, it 
announced its shutting down and the cancelling of all 
flights as of midnight (Ziemba p. 1d). 
Eastern Airlines was a good example in that it 
exemplified numerous causes of corporate failure, and it 
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patterned the normal procedures for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
But on the other hand, it was a bad example because phase 2 
of the proceedings were not the same as those mentioned in 
Chapter V. Eastern failed when the major point of phase 2 
is to succeed in reorganization. To show examples of a 
successful phase 2, the next section will cover in less 
detail bankruptcy cases that were successful in 
reorganizing. 
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Chapter VIII 
Successful Reorganizations 
This section is meant to show success through 
reorganization. The writer takes no credit for the 
originality of the material. All information from this 
section comes from Ramaswami's and Moeller's book. 
The largest bankruptcy in history was filed by Texaco, 
Inc. on April 12, 1987. Texaco was healthy prior to a jury 
verdict in December of 1985 that caused it to pay Pennzoil 
$10.3 million for interfering with its attempt to acquire 
Getty oil Company. Texaco had ac~~red Getty in 1984. The 
actual reasons for Texaco's failure is really unknown: it 
merely could not meet a mandatory payment that was outside 
normal business practices. If the writer had to make a 
guess, he would charge this failure to "bad luck." Some say 
that the failure could be due to a lack of vigilance due to 
the permissive environment toward mergers and acquisitions 
during the 1980's. 
Texaco emerged from the bankruptcy proceedings on 
April 7, 1988, after the court had approved its plan. As a 
part of the reorganization, Texaco was to pay Pennzoil $3 
billion in settlement of the $10.3 billion. This was 
successful because Pennzoil voluntarily offered Texaco a 
composition which was defined earlier as taking less than is 
actually owed. This is usually not a favored choice, but 
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Pennzoil must have seen it as beneficial. Texaco survived 
its reorganization; a statistic to prove its success was its 
stock price on April 12 of 1987 was only $31 but on that 
same day in 1989 it was $53.60. 
Two other recent reorganizations came from the 
bankruptcies of A. H. Robin and Manville Corporation. Both 
failures were caused by inadequate product testing and the 
lack of management appreciation. A. H. Robin was forced to 
file for Chapter 11 protection to freeze thousands of 
lawsuits by women hurt by the Dalkon Shield Interuterine 
Device that it produced. Manville's failure was also caused 
by a defective product; many people sued the firm due to 
asbestos poisoning from one of its products. Both firms 
reorganized successfully after setting up trust funds for 
all of the claimants. A. H. Robin chose a different route 
as it was acquired by American Home Products, who set up a 
trust for the claimants and perfected its products. 
Manville's success was due to its decision to quit producing 
asbestos based products. 
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Chapter IX 
Conclusion 
As anyone can see, a successful reorganization is hard 
to achieve. Eastern's management was unable to adapt to its 
recognized problems so that it was unsuccessful. Other 
companies have had the same problems that Eastern did, but 
their managements were competent enough to accept the causes 
and fix them through an acceptable plan. If the firms could 
have noticed the causes earlier, they could have alluded the 
Chapter 11 process, but some firms need the formal 
bankruptcy proceedings so that they can effectively 
restructure themselves so that they can be more successful 
and flexible towards change. 
In the rest of this chapter, I want to give an 
evaluation of what I think of the Bankruptcy Code and 
Chapter 11 using the knowledge I have gained through writing 
this thesis. As a relief from debts, I feel that the 
Bankruptcy code is needed in our society because it provides 
a way for a debtor firm to "pay off" its debts. Chapter 11, 
in my opinion, may be too lenient because on many occasions 
it allows incompetent management to recover when it really 
should not be able to. In our competitive free enterprise 
system, if a manager is not competent to survive, maybe he 
should find another career. Chapter 11 is good if the cause 
of failure was due to something beyond the control of 
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management; it may also be an adequate remedy if the 
incompetence of the management was only a minor contributor 
to the failure. I honestly feel that the court hearing the 
initial bankruptcy case should be more strict in allowing 
for reorganization. The decision to reorganize or to 
liquidate should not be made by anyone but the judge. If 
the judge feels that the firm would be worth more as a 
reorganized firm, then and only then should Chapter 11 be 
used. If the judge finds that the creditors would benefit 
equally from a liquidation or from a reorganization, I feel 
that liquidation should be used. My reasoning for the 
previous statement is that if management caused the failure, 
why should it be given a second chance under reorganization. 
The judge should also decide whether the management is 
competent enough to continue control in all cases just as 
the judge did in the Eastern Airlines case. 
As a process, the bankruptcy code is good because it 
brings a very confusing process into one piece of 
legislation. I feel that as a process Chapter 11 is good 
because it shows all of the steps needed for a successful 
reorganization. It begins at the failure and outlines the 
entire procedure. If management is confused about what to 
do next, it can go to Chapter 11 and the next step will be 
provided. 
As a whole, I feel Chapter 11 is needed in our society 
today because it provides an effective way to handle a 
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bankruptcy case. The only change I would propose would be 
in the bankruptcy code as a whole. I would add an initial 
court hearing so that a judge can decide whether the 
bankrupt firm should go through Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 and 
if the management is competent enough to continue the 
control of the firm. Once the court decided that the 
management was indeed competent and that Chapter 11 would be 
the best route, I feel that Chapter 11 needs no changes to 
be an effective way of handling the problem of corporate 
bankruptcy. 
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